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TIME FOR HUMANITARIAN MINE 
ACTION TO CATCH UP?
H
umanitarian mine action (HMA) survey and clearance 
operations have always focused on the contamination that 
can be seen. Whether it is anti-personnel (AP) mines, anti-
vehicles (AV) mines, or explosive remnants of war (ERW), our efforts 
focus on removing items that pose an immediate blast and fragmen-
tation hazard to humans. However, in certain circumstances, explo-
sive ordnance (EO) also poses a significant environmental hazard, 
not least from the toxicity of its components, such as heavy metals 
and explosives. The understanding of contamination from EO in air, 
soil, and water has developed significantly in recent decades.1-4 This 
has mainly been driven by scientists and industry, as well as military 
users required to focus on the environmental impact of military train-
ing, and led to the development of improved management practices to 
mitigate the associated environmental risk.5-8 In some countries this 
has resulted in significant policy change. Notably the tonnage of muni-
tions disposed of by open burning open detonation (OBOD) by the 
United States Department of Defense decreased by 58 percent during 
the period 1998–2018.9 In comparison, it is not clear that HMA is uni-
versally applying best practice to mitigate the chemical contamination 
risk from its clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activi-
ties. A sector that follows simple principles such as “do no harm” and 
ostensibly always seeks to apply “all reasonable effort” might wish to 
review and update its current approach. 
HMA often operates in environments where perfection may be 
deemed the enemy of good. What is practicable on a military range 
in the United Kingdom might not be so in the complex environments 
of current HMA operations. Therefore, the task is to develop practical 
mitigation methods that have a good chance of being applied, no mat-
ter the location. Examples of such methods could range from using an 
inexpensive kit to check the pH of soil for a central demolition area, to 
more training to recognize and safely dispose of munitions containing 
heavy metal tungsten alloys (HMTA). A number of practical improve-
ments are possible. The first step for HMA organizations is to recognize 
the issues and then implement better methods accordingly. 
LEGISLATION
Relevant legislation tends to cover broad principles of pollution 
rather than specific contamination types such as those from EO. Such 
international legislation that does exist governs the disposal of muni-
tions that cross international borders and, as an example, preclude the 
dumping of munitions at sea. The European Union’s Water Framework 
Directive 2000/60/EC10 and the United States Clean Water Act 197211 
are important reference points. In the United Kingdom, the Water 
Resources Act 199112 and the Environmental Protection Act 199013 are 
the key pieces of legislation. Beneath the level of legislation, the Inter-
national Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 10.10 specifies the 
need for national authorities to set the standards governing environ-
mental protection within national borders,14 but how much this has 
been applied globally is open to question.15 IMAS 07.13, Environmental 
Management in Mine Action, does “not enforce specific practical miti-
gation measures but is a framework giving the tools for the NMAA to 
define these.”16
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF HMA
HMA damages the environment. A certain level of damage is inevi-
table. Traditionally this damage has been associated with the physical 
process of clearing land of AP and AV mines. To clear land invariably 
requires most vegetation to be removed, with the possible exception of 
trees above a certain size, alongside physical excavation of the topsoil. 
This damage was, and is, accepted as an inevitable part of the demining 
process. Typically, the damage would not be permanent, and the land 
re-used relatively quickly. Locals often welcome the clearance on the 
basis that the land will be easier to cultivate once mine action has not 
only removed the mines but also removed much of the vegetation and 
made the soil easier to work.17 Clearance operations among sand dunes 
have required the remediation of the environment, once the clearance 
is completed, as was the case in Skallingen up to 2012.18 Aside from the 
potential physical damage, mine action organizations also impact the 
environment in the same way most human activity does, be it emis-
sions from vehicles or generators, human waste, etc. It is this generic 
impact that has been, to a degree, addressed within IMAS 07.13 and in 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). 
The chemical contamination from explosives has often not been rec-
ognized or understood by clearance operators. Few SOPs include direc-
tion on how to mitigate the environmental impact of burning small 
arms ammunition (SAA), open burning or open detonation of high 
explosive natures, destruction of certain types of white phosphorous, 
or destruction of armor penetrating ammunition containing HMTA. 
Furthermore, at some point HMA operators will encounter EO con-
taining insensitive explosive formulations, the inherent environmental 
hazards of which are subject to continuing research. These formula-
tions present a potentially different pollution hazard compared with 
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traditional munitions. Such contamination is or will be part of HMA’s 
environmental impact, and operators are responsible for the contami-
nation that could reasonably have been prevented during clearance 
and disposal operations.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (SAA)
Most SAA contains lead, along with smaller amounts of alloying 
material such as antimony. Lead slag is classified as Toxic Solid UN 6.1 
(UN ID 3288).19 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Food and Drug Administration states that in “humans and animals, 
exposure to lead may cause neurological, reproductive, developmental, 
immune, cardiovascular and renal health effects. In general, sensitiv-
ity to lead toxicity is greater when there is exposure in utero and in 
children compared to adults.”20
The safe disposal of SAA presents a significant ongoing challenge 
to HMA clearance operators. The days when SAA was added to bulk 
demolitions are hopefully long in the past. Currently, most SAA is 
burnt in some way. Open pit burns used to be one technique used, but 
this method is guaranteed to introduce lead contamination directly 
into the soil. Organizations have developed improvised or bespoke 
burning tanks that, if strong enough, are also used to burn the primers 
and boosters within fuzes of a certain size. Military organizations have 
increasingly used industrial rotary kilns. The capital expenditure these 
require has meant they are yet to be deployed in HMA. 
Regardless of the method of burning, the slag residue from SAA is 
typically buried. This is potentially a significant risk to the environ-
ment, especially if done in large quantities. Burial without knowl-
edge of local soil and water course conditions is a practice that should 
cease in HMA. Many operators are unaware of the concept of fate and 
transport of lead contamination. In simple terms this follows a source-
pathway-receptor (SPR) model, with lead being the source in this 
instance. The pathway would be the means by which the contaminant 
moves through the environment; by air, soil, or water. The receptor 
is the entity that can be adversely affected by the contaminant.21 The 
transport depends on contaminant solubility, which in turn is gov-
erned by pH and oxidation. Lead is an amphoteric metal that exhibits 
its greatest solubility in acidic (pH < 4) and heavily alkaline (pH > 11) 
solutions.22 “Lead corrodes and leaches readily in acidic conditions to 
concentrations that can exceed guidelines for human health and con-
trolled waters.”23 Despite this risk, no current HMA SOPs are known to 
detail even a basic environmental risk assessment prior to the burial of 
SAA slag residue, or even possible mitigation measures. 
HEAVY METAL TUNGSTEN ALLOYS
The concern over the alleged carcinogenic effects of depleted ura-
nium (DU) since 1991 lead to the development of tungsten alloys as 
an alternative for armor piercing ammunition.24 Unfortunately, tung-
sten alloys have been the cause of increasing concern for those charged 
with mitigating the environmental impact on military firing ranges. 
Tungsten alloys have been proven to be carcinogenic during animal 
testing.25,26  The main risk for HMA staff and civilians who may come 
into contact with HMTA are sintered27 splinters piercing the skin and 
An SAA burn pit. The SAA was burnt in an open pit with a simple metal cover. The 
slag residue was subsequently buried. This method is hopefully no longer used 
by operators. Burying the slag residue from SAA pit burns concentrates the toxic 
waste and is potentially a significant pollution risk.
Image © Private.
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subsequently becoming embedded, 
especially for alloys combining tung-
sten with nickel or cobalt.28 HMTA 
ammunition, whether it is from SAA 
or long rod penetrators, is far more 
likely to sinter if added inadvertently 
to bulk demolitions. In a worst-
case scenario, whether by means of 
a single item demolition or as part 
of a bulk demolition, an unknow-
ing operator could spread dangerous 
WNiCo splinters29 into the environ-
ment posing a risk to themselves, 




Most high explosive munitions 
contain one or both of Cyclotrimeth-
ylenetrinitramine (RDX) or Trinitro-
toluene (TNT). Munitions containing 
RDX invariably contain a small  per-
centage of cyclotetramethylene-tetra-
nitramine (HMX) and more modern 
shaped charges will often have HMX 
as the key energetic ingredient. All 
three explosives have some degree of 
toxicity.30 The nitro aromatic TNT 
can undergo degradation to form 
the 2,4 Dnitrotoluene (DNT) isomer, 
a common biodegradation product 
of TNT that displays greater toxic-
ity. DNT can convert haemoglobin 
to methaglobin31 at a relatively low 
threshold limit of 0.13 mg/L and is therefore listed by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as hazardous waste.32 DNT is 
highly toxic to humans.33,34 
The nitramine RDX has been designated a possible human car-
cinogen (categorization C) by the EPA. The EPA has set drinking 
water advisory limits for TNT, RDX, and HMX.35,36  TNT and DNT 
tend to bind to organic matter in the earth and therefore don’t trans-
port as readily as RDX, which has greater potential as a pollutant of 
groundwater.37
These explosives present a particular issue for HMA operators since 
much of the EO destroyed by the sector is by means of second order 
detonation, i.e., a donor charge is used to shatter the casing and initi-
ate the main charge by means of sympathetic detonation. Some high 
explosive munitions, especially thin-cased mines, may be destroyed by 
(Above) An inert cutaway of the new HMTA 40 mm telescopic APFS-DS-T round. 
Ammunition containing HMTA, especially WNiCo alloys, pose a hazard to humans 
if sintered splinters puncture the skin. Are we training HMA EOD operators to cor-
rectly identify and dispose of such ammunition?
Image courtesy of Andrew Duncan.
burning. There is now substantial evidence to suggest that both meth-
ods will result in significant levels of energetic residue compared with 
a first order detonation, where the munition fuzing system detonates 
the main charge as intended after firing.38,39 Testing of military firing 
ranges over time suggests that contamination tends to stay in the top-
soil, approximately the first 30 cm, depending on the soil type.40,41 For 
HMA operators the risk is highest in areas where high EO is repeat-
edly destroyed by second order demolition, i.e., a central demolition 
site (CDS), a process sometimes referred to as “residue loading.” This 
risk is higher in areas with moderate or high levels of precipitation, 
a shallow water table, slow moving groundwater, and proximity to a 
water course.42 What measures do HMA operators currently take to 
monitor and limit the explosive residue contamination from second 
order demolitions? 
INSENSITIVE MUNITION EXPLOSIVE 
FORMULATIONS
Many NATO countries are developing insensitive munitions (IM). 
Typically, this development concentrates on the high explosive fill, 
with traditional formulations such as Composition B (60 percent TNT, 
40 percent RDX), being replaced by formulations containing reduced 
vulnerability energetic materials. These will have high thermal stabil-
ity and will to some degree be resistant to shock. Explosives such as 
Nitrotriazolone (NTO) and 2,4-Dinitroanisole (DNAN) are key ingre-
dients for the new US insensitive explosives, IMX-101 and IMX-104, 
being fielded for gun artillery and mortars respectively. Both NTO43 
and DNAN44 are undergoing further study to assess acute and chronic 
toxicity on the environment and humans.45 In terms of residue depos-
ited from IM munitions, recent testing has shown that standard meth-
ods of high order for single items of high EO leave significantly more 
explosive residue.46,47 For example, PAX-21, an insensitive formulation 
of RDX, DNAN, and ammonium perchlorate, can deposit residues of 
up to 28 percent of the perchlorate, even during first order detona-
tions.48  Ammonium perchlorate residues are also common at firing 
points, and it may therefore be assumed in areas where HMA operators 
burn propellant, residues will also be high. The US EPA identifies the 
chronic exposure to perchlorate, (even at very low levels), as interfering 
with the iodine uptake into the thyroid gland.49 
WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN?
The first and main practical step for HMA operators to take is 
to ensure that their professional knowledge of explosives remains 
current, and to update their procedures accordingly. This requires 
developing SOPs detailing how they will minimize the risk of chem-
ical contamination from the disposal of EO including SAA. These 
should include direction on the safe disposal of SAA slag residue, 
ideally contracted through specialized waste disposal companies. 
Since these are invariably not present in many countries, at a mini-
mum, operators should ensure that no slag residue is buried in acidic 
soils and should conduct the simple tests to ensure this. (A simple 
soil pH testing kit can be purchased for as little as USD$10.) If there 
is no other option but to bury SAA slag residue, it should be sealed in 
watertight plastic barrels to prevent leaching into the surrounding 
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soil. For destruction of large quantities of SAA associated with a 
national stockpile this presents a logistical challenge since large 
quantities of barrels will be required.
Large-scale disposal of propellants and pyrotechnics often leaves an 
obvious area of contamination on the soil. Most of this contamination 
stays on the surface until rainwater washes it into the subsoil. Having 
considered the proximity of local water courses, where deemed prac-
tical, consideration may be given to the mechanical excavation and 
removal of this residue. It can then be treated in the same way as SAA 
slag is dealt with. The Canadian military developed a burning table 
technique for their artillery units to avoid open burning of excess pro-
pellants following live firing exercises50 and it is possible the technique 
could be adapted for use in HMA.
In order to mitigate the actual residue deposition from second 
order demolition, operators should consider increasing the amount 
and quality of donor charge used, especially for repeat bulk demo-
litions at a CDS. If the fuze well is empty, as might be the case for 
destruction of stockpiled ordnance or abandoned explosive ordnance 
(AXO), operators are advised to use this for donor charge placement 
in order to maximize the chance of a first order detonation. Assuming 
some residue is unavoidable, operators should be careful about the 
sites selected for CDS. Again, acidic soil is likely to enable greater 
transport of contaminants and therefore soil at CDS should be tested. 
Ideally CDS should be a good distance from water courses and known 
groundwater locations.
Although IM are not yet commonly encountered within HMA, 
operators should understand the impact of their insensitivity dur-
ing disposal. When destroying unfuzed ordnance from stockpiles, a 
donor charge placed in the fuze well should ensure full detonation. 
This is because the IM requires confinement to fully detonate, and 
a donor charge that is placed on the outer cas-
ing will have reduced the confinement before 
detonation of the internal explosive occurs. 
Alternatively, if the fuze well cannot be utilized, 
a shaped charge aimed at the booster is the best 
means of minimizing explosive residue.51,52 
Further testing is required to determine if IM 
can be effectively destroyed through sympa-
thetic detonation by means of bulk demolition.
For both SAA burning sites and CDS (often 
the same location), operators should consider 
instituting a soil sampling regime. The time and 
the cost might be deemed impractical but ulti-
mately HMA operators need to monitor at-risk 
locations in order to manage the potential con-
tamination their disposal activities may create.
In order to mitigate the potential harm from 
HMTA, the key action for operators is to ensure 
all technical staff can accurately identify EO 
containing HMTA, whether it be SAA or a 125 
mm long rod penetrator. Such munitions should 
not be disposed of through standard OBOD 
techniques. HMTA should be handed over to the competent authority 
for processing.
CONCLUSION
As research continues, understanding of the actual chemical con-
tamination risk from EO evolves. Even in defense circles, where most 
of the funding for this research originates, there is a wide appreciation 
that there is plenty more left to learn.53 Nevertheless, those responsible 
for mitigating environmental contamination in modern defense orga-
nizations are far in advance of HMA on these issues, not least since 
they tend to operate within legal frameworks that are becoming ever 
more stringent in regard to pollution of the environment.54 Countries 
such as Germany and the Netherlands banned domestic use of OBOD 
in the 2000s55,56 and elsewhere its use as a demilitarization method is 
subject to ever more stringent restrictions.57 OBOD techniques are 
“strictly prohibited” within the framework of industrial demilitar-
ization contracts managed by the NATO Support and Procurement 
Agency (NSPA), although they are permitted in other contracts.58
HMA operators still have much to do in order to make sure they are 
applying all reasonable effort in order to minimize the risk of chemical 
contamination from the munitions they clear. HMA is in no position 
to stop OBOD, and it is in no way appropriate that it should. However, 
HMA is able to make sure it is done in a way where risks are responsi-
bly managed. There are practical measures that can be taken, and these 
should be integrated into the relevant technical documents, including 
operator SOPs. Hopefully HMA operators will one day not find them-
selves in a position where their best intentions of removing EO have 
been undermined by an inadvertent act of pollution that could rea-
sonably have been avoided. We should actively avoid doing the wrong 
thing in the wrong place under the wrong conditions. While actual 
Bulk demolition using binary liquid explosive. How much explosive residue may be deposited by repeat bulk 
demolitions at central demolition sites by HMA operators? Are EOD operators aware that such techniques will 
need to be adapted for insensitive munitions? Are EOD operators aware of the risks of adding HMTA ammuni-
tion to such a demolition?
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
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explosive hazards have arguably a more immediate significance to the 
people we are trying to help, reputational risk to HMA organizations 
is real, as of course are the moral and legal risks. 
In terms of the environment, it is virtually impossible for HMA 
organizations to “do no harm.” Clearing ground of EO, especially 
landmines, inevitably has an environmental impact, whether it is veg-
etation clearance, physical damage to topsoil or contamination of soil 
and water by toxic energetics. The key will be to show we are making 
“all reasonable effort” to minimize environmental contamination to a 
level no more than necessary to remove the immediate blast and frag-
mentation hazard. 
See endnotes page 68
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A detonation plume from a high explosive ordnance residue test in Alaska. Snow is the perfect medium for measuring the environmental deposition of energetics. 
Researchers at the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) used various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with both traditional and 
insensitive high explosives fillings. 
Image courtesy of Michael Walsh/CRREL.
IMX-104 fill spread after a low-order technique. Second order and low order techniques are prone to leave more residue. Researchers at the CRREL in Alaska have used 
various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with insensitive high explosives fillings. 
Image courtesy of Michael R. Walsh/CRREL.
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